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Abstract This introduction lays the groundwork for this Special Issue by providing an
overview of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), and
by introducing three main analytical themes. The first theme concerns the emergence and
continuation of the APP. The contributions show that the emergence of the APP can be
attributed to international factors, including the United States’ rejection of the Kyoto
Protocol, and its search for an alternative arena for global climate governance, and other
countries’ wish to maintain good relations with the US; as well as domestic factors, such as
the presence of bureaucratic actors in favour of the Partnership, alignment with domestic
priorities, and the potential for reaping economic benefits through participation. The
second theme examines the nature of the Partnership, concluding that it falls on the very
soft side of the hard–soft law continuum and that while being branded as a public–private
partnership, governments remain in charge. Under the third theme, the influence which the
APP exerts on the post-2012 United Nations (UN) climate change negotiations is scruti-
nised. The contributions show that at the very least, the APP is exerting some cognitive
influence on the UN discussions through its promotion of a sectoral approach. The
introduction concludes with outlining areas for future research.
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1 Introduction
The creation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) in
2005 by the United States and Australia (who convinced Japan, South Korea, India and
China to join; Canada enrolled later) provoked reactions from deep cynicism of it being
only a public relations ploy to feign action on climate change, via indifference to an effort
expecting to yield no impact, to harsh criticism and fear of it being a threat to the legally
binding United Nations (UN) climate regime (van Asselt 2007). While most researchers
have found the Partnership too insignificant to warrant serious attention, the contributors to
this Special Issue argue differently. They see it as essential to put the Partnership under the
magnifying glass, in order to provide a more solid foundation for criticism or praise of the
APP, as well as an assessment of its wider implications for global climate governance. The
objective of this Special Issue is therefore to offer a state of the art analysis of research on
the APP carried out and situate this in a theoretical discussion from several starting points
including institutional interplay, legalization and ecological modernisation, as well as an
empirical exploration of global climate governance.
More specifically, this Special Issue aims to:
(1) explain the creation and survival of the APP by looking closer at four of its member
countries: Australia, China, Japan and the United States;
(2) understand whether the APP’s nature as an intergovernmental partnership, which in
its implementation phase takes the form of a public–private partnership, reflects any
particular shift in national and global environmental governance;
(3) analyse how the APP interacts with, and possibly influences, the post-2012
negotiation process and the global climate regime in general, and explore how this
dynamic may develop in the future.
In the first contribution to the Special Issue, Jeffrey McGee and Ros Taplin show how
the APP has been used in the discursive contestation of the international climate regime,
arguing that it represents an at least temporary manifestation of a weak form of ecological
modernisation. The following contribution, by Antto Vihma, examines in more detail how
the APP and other soft law initiatives have been used in the UN-based climate negotia-
tions. The other contributions focus on the role of the APP in different member countries.
Tora Skodvin and Steinar Andresen first analyse the changes in the roles of the different
branches of the United States’ government in international climate policy. Next, Peter
Lawrence examines how and why the APP has gained support in Australia from two
different governments. Gørild Heggelund and Inga Fritzen Buan then outline the reasons
for why China has joined the Partnership. In the final contribution, Harro van Asselt,
Norichika Kanie and Masahiko Iguchi discuss why Japan has sought to participate in both
the APP and the UN climate regime.
In this introduction to the Special Issue, we lay the groundwork for the three analytical
themes, and examine the answers which the contributions provide to the questions raised
here. We first place our focus on the APP in the context of research examining the
fragmentation of global climate governance (Sect. 2), followed by a general overview of
the APP and its main features (Sect. 3). We then discuss some of the main questions that
are addressed in this Special Issue. First, we examine why and how the APP emerged and
evolved, and why countries participate, focusing on four member countries (Sect. 4).
Second, we discuss how the Partnership’s nature can be characterised (Sect. 5). Third, we
address the relation to the UN climate regime with a view to identifying the implications
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for future climate governance (Sect. 6). Finally, we draw conclusions and provide some
guidance for further research (Sect. 7).
2 The fragmentation of global climate governance
The emergence of global climate governance was closely linked to the UN, and thus to a
multilateral framework including a wide range of countries. Notably, the UN hosted the
negotiations for the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). Until the early 2000s, the UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol provided the
primary intergovernmental arena where climate change was being addressed. It was the
‘only game in town’ in a time that climate change was still considered to be a controversial
and unproven problem for some countries, and an essentially ‘Northern’ problem for many
developing countries. Climate change could still be relegated to the ‘low politics’ of
environmental problems even in those countries that acknowledged and wanted to address
the problem, while developing countries never considered it to be an environmental
problem but a social and economic one, linked to inequity. With an increasing under-
standing of both the seriousness of the threat of dangerous climate change and the inter-
linkages with a range of other issue areas, the number of international arenas tackling the
issue multiplied in the 2000s.
Existing international organisations have taken steps to integrate climate change con-
cerns in their operations (e.g. World Bank 2008), and a range of new, more or less
institutionalised forms of international cooperation have been initiated, for example, with
the bodies of other multilateral environmental agreements (van Asselt et al. 2005). Fur-
thermore, different UN bodies, including the Security Council, have started to address the
issue (Sindico 2007). This has resulted in an increased fragmentation of global climate
governance in terms of the actors engaged and the approaches taken to influence behaviour
at different levels (Pattberg and Stripple 2008). Some of these initiatives have involved the
highest level of political leaders such as the G8 Summits in 2005, 2007 and 2008, while
others involve deliberations of ministers or other senior officials such as the Gleneagles
Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development initiated by the
G8, or the Major Economies Process on Energy Security and Climate Change launched by
US President Bush in 2007. Other initiatives have taken the shape of multi-stakeholder
partnerships involving governments, corporations and/or non-governmental organisations.
These partnerships have often focused on one particular clean technology, such as the
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum and the International Partnership for a Hydrogen
Economy, or have supported investment and policy development in broader areas, such as
the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership. Several of these partnerships
were initiated around the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in
2002. In contrast, the focus of this Special Issue, the APP, is a rather special form of
partnership, as we shall discuss further below, in terms of its origin, institutional form and
approach.
All these initiatives operate in parallel to the UN-based multilateral process, which in
2007 launched negotiations towards a post-2012 climate change regime, expected to reach
their crescendo in December 2009 (see generally Biermann et al. 2010). Many of the
initiatives have in common that they address research, development, deployment and
diffusion of clean energy technologies, and they take on mitigation as one of their main
themes (de Coninck et al. 2008). Furthermore, all initiatives bring together a limited
number of key players (e.g. major emitters, large economies, countries interested in
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specific technologies, and/or specific business sector actors). In addition, the various
arrangements are only loosely linked to the UN climate regime.
Climate policy research has increasingly focused on this growing fragmentation of global
climate governance (Biermann et al. 2009, in press). Most of this research has examined the
potential for effective climate change mitigation through multiple agreements between like-
minded country coalitions as opposed to a more ‘universal’ approach including all countries
(e.g. Sugiyama and Sinton 2005; Victor 2007; Hof et al. 2009). Another recurring theme has
been how these initiatives may interact with the UN climate regime (e.g. McGee and Taplin
2006; Lawrence 2007; van Asselt 2007). Our analysis of the APP is part of these efforts, but
also identifies further research directions in the broader theoretical context of the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of legalization and global governance.
3 Overview of the APP
On 28 July 2005, the APP was officially announced in Vientiane, Laos, by the then six
participating countries. This announcement came 4 years after US President Bush rejected
the Kyoto Protocol; 3 years after the Australian Prime Minister Howard did the same;
5 months after the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force, thanks to Russia’s long-pending
ratification; and 3 weeks after the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, where climate was
high on the agenda. Little was known about the initiative prior to its announcement. It thus
came as a surprise to many, and immediately elicited strong criticism on a number of
grounds; particularly that it was undermining the Kyoto Protocol, that it would be inef-
fective in reducing emissions, and that it was just a public relations stunt to create the
illusion that the two major Kyoto Protocol ‘defectors’, the US and Australia, were taking
action (Lawrence 2009, this issue; Vihma 2009, this issue).
The six founding APP nations together accounted for almost half of global greenhouse
gas emissions in 2001 (Fisher et al. 2006), and this was a major rationale given by the
founders for creating the APP and for its potential to be effective. In 2005, the countries
represented more than half of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and worldwide
energy consumption, and almost half of global gross domestic product (GDP) and the
world population (Table 1). However, there are also significant differences between the
member countries: they cover a very broad range of per capita emissions and energy
consumption, and the annual income per person varies significantly (Table 1). While all
are market economies, their political and constitutional systems vary considerably, even if
China is the only non-democracy in the group. Undoubtedly, one of the most important
differences lies in how they interpret the principle of ‘common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ put forward in the UN climate regime (see
generally Rajamani 2005), and thus essentially how they view their respective obligations
to address climate change now and in the future. All countries in the group, except for the
US and Australia, were parties to the Kyoto Protocol and have supported the UN climate
regime (although Canada started to waver later). The US and initially Australia declined to
ratify the Protocol largely because developing countries like China and India were exempt
from legally binding emission reduction commitments. South Korea had left the G77 in
1996, joined the OECD, and might be one of the first rapidly industrialising countries to
take on legally binding commitments in the future. China, and even more India, however,
have vehemently opposed taking on any emission reduction commitments in a post-2012
agreement (Korppoo and Luta 2009), emphasising the historic responsibility of indus-
trialised countries and their own need to grow and reduce poverty. While members of the
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APP thus shared certain basic characteristics, such as their geographical location in the
Asia-Pacific rim as well as their substantial energy needs and large total emissions, they
differed significantly in others, notably their approach to climate governance. This begs the
question why they agreed to join the APP in the first place. We will return to this question
in the next section.
The APP was created as a non-legally binding ‘compact’ (APP Vision Statement 2006),
aiming ‘to meet (…) increased energy needs and associated challenges, including those
related to air pollution, energy security and greenhouse gas intensities’ (APP Charter 2006,
para 1.1). Even though it is formally an intergovernmental partnership, it envisages a key role
for private sector actors from companies and business associations. The Partnership focuses
on greenhouse gas intensity (i.e. the ratio of greenhouse gases emissions and economic
output), and stresses that development and poverty eradication are ‘urgent and overriding
goals internationally’ (APP Charter 2006, para 1.1). Climate change mitigation is thus by
implication only a subsidiary goal. The participating countries intend to achieve their goals
through international cooperation on the development, diffusion, deployment and transfer of
clean, efficient and cost-effective technologies (APP Charter 2006, para 2.1.1).
The primary working mode of the Partnership is through sector-specific task forces.
Currently, the following task forces have been established: (1) aluminium, (2) buildings
and appliances, (3) cement, (4) cleaner fossil energy, (5) coal mining, (6) power generation
and transmission, (7) renewable energy and distributed generation, and (8) steel. Each of
these task forces has developed an action plan, which sets out the main objectives and
identifies activities and projects to be implemented. There is a possibility that new task
forces will be established for sectors not yet included, such as road transport, for which a
task force was proposed by Japan in 2008. The main decision-making body in the Part-
nership is the Policy and Implementation Committee (PIC), which ‘oversees the Partner-
ship as a whole, guides the eight Task Forces and periodically reviews their work’.1 The
PIC is composed of senior government representatives, often the same people who
negotiate in the UNFCCC for their countries.2 The PIC also approves the draft action plans
Table 1 Selected indicators for the APP nations; all data for 2005 (based on WRI 2009)
Share of global
CO2 emissions
(%) (excl.
LULUCF*)
Share of
global energy
consumption
(%)
Share of
global
GDP
(%)
Share of
global
population
(%)
CO2
emissions
per capita
(tonnes)
Energy
consumption
per capita
(tonnes oil-eq.)
GDP
per
capita
(US$)
Australia 1.39 1.1 1.1 0.32 18.7 6 31,656
Canada 2.03 2.4 2.0 0.50 17.3 8.4 34,972
China 20.26 15.3 9.5 20.19 4.3 1.3 4,088
India 4.44 4.8 4.3 16.94 1.1 0.5 2,230
Japan 4.54 4.7 6.9 1.98 9.8 4.2 30,290
S. Korea 1.72 1.9 1.8 0.75 9.8 4.4 21,273
US 21.40 20.9 22.1 4.59 19.9 7.9 41,813
Total 55.75% 51.1% 47.7% 45.27%
* Land use, land-use change and forestry
1 See http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/faq.aspx, retrieved May 24, 2009.
2 Interview, Jan Adams, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 1 December
2006.
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submitted by the task forces. The US has a dominant position in the institutional set-up of
the APP, as reflected in its founding role and its chairing of the PIC since its inception.
Each task force in turn is led by a Chair and a co-Chair country. India and China, as the
only non-OECD member countries, are also the only ones who do not hold the Chair of a
task force but they serve as co-Chairs for two each.
In contrast with UN negotiations, civil society organisations have generally not been
invited to the international meetings of the Partnership, even though the PIC is in principle
open to invite ‘relevant governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organi-
zations, where appropriate’ (APP Charter 2006, para 4.2). In addition to the private sector,
organisations that have been invited to attend include the International Energy Agency and
the Asian Development Bank. The participation of non-state actors is slightly broader in
the implementation of specific task force projects, but overall the APP is a government
initiated and driven collaboration with the business sector.
A closer look at the APP task force action plans reveals that most projects are designed
to facilitate transboundary interactions between relevant actors in selected sectors in dif-
ferent member countries. Examples of activities include the exchange of specialists, joint
analysis of sectoral mitigation opportunities, the organisation of workshops, and the
development of best practice guides.3 The project descriptions differ in their level of detail,
but some projects also include the demonstration of a new technology, such as the use of
clean coal technologies in the cleaner fossil energy task force, and piloting the use of
policy instruments in a country, such as building labelling in China. Other activities, for
example in the steel and cement sectors, are aimed at the identification of benchmarks and
performance indicators, however, none of the action plans sets any targets for emission
reductions in their sector, and most project activities are unlikely to lead to direct emission
reductions. The action plans provide a review of the relevant sectors and areas, and identify
barriers to the deployment and diffusion of technologies.
At the time of writing, the PIC has met seven times, while the number of high-level
ministerial meetings has been limited to two. The APP website lists 168 project activities,
of which most are in the buildings and appliances (52) and renewable energy and dis-
tributed generation (37) task forces, whereas the number of projects in the steel (6),
aluminium (7) and cement (10) sectors is still relatively low. So far, 16 projects have been
cancelled, while 7 projects are listed as ‘completed’.4
Although public funding is essential for the implementation of the Partnership in terms
of leveraging private investments (Pezzey et al. 2008), pledges for APP activities have
been rather limited. First, the previous US administration had difficulties securing approval
for a part of its funding (van Asselt 2007). According to the US APP website, the US
government has so far pledged US$ 65 million to the Partnership, which is expected to
result in additional funding of US$ 480 million from non-governmental actors.5 Second,
the new Australian government reduced the pledged funding from A$ 150 million to A$
100 million over 5 years (Lawrence 2009, this issue). Third, the Canadian government has
promised a mere C$ 20 million spread over 3 years (Canada 2008). Public funding
announcements for the other countries have not been made, although contributions are at
least made indirectly at a small scale through the chairing of task forces and the hosting of
APP meetings, workshops, etc.
3 See http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/project_roster.aspx, retrieved April 29, 2009.
4 Ibid.
5 See http://www.app.gov/library/111306.htm, retrieved May 17, 2009.
200 S. I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, H. van Asselt
123
4 Explaining the emergence and continuation of the APP
At the time the APP was formed, two closely linked multilateral climate treaties, both
enjoying wide country participation, were already in force. This raises the question what
could have moved the founding countries to pursue the establishment of the APP, and the
others countries to accept the invitation. It seems likely from the timing and political
context of the APP’s formation that it would not have been created in the absence of the
Kyoto Protocol, and that the APP was formed ‘because of it’ (Biermann et al. 2009, in
press). In order to provide a more detailed explanation, we have to look at the different
rationales that various member countries may have had to establish or join the APP. We
start by examining how the Partnership was initiated.
The conception of the APP by the US and Australia was influenced by the international
political context at the time. There had been loose discussions between the US and
Australia for at least a year—partly as a result of other technology-centred partnerships
the countries had initiated—on how to involve major economies in the Asia-Pacific region
in climate change mitigation.6 In early 2005, the US government decided to approach key
countries in the region starting with the Australian government—which immediately
expressed its support.7 The timing of these more concrete discussions on the APP was
thus very close to the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. In February 2005, when the
world was celebrating the hard-sought entry into force in a sort of defiant support of
multilateralism after the US rejection, it is quite natural that the US wanted to improve its
reputation and show some initiative. It seems logical that the US sought the support of the
other Kyoto ‘defector’ in the enterprise. Australia, likewise, saw in the APP a way to
justify its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol by embarking on an alternative path. The
Howard government looked particularly towards the Asia-Pacific region, both through the
APP and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (Lawrence 2009, this
issue).
The ‘official’ rationale for the two initiating countries was to find a way to engage India
and China—the two largest greenhouse gas emitters among the developing countries and at
the same time important trading partners—in climate change mitigation. For the US, the
lack of ‘meaningful participation’ by these countries had been one of the principal reasons
underlying its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Skodvin and Andresen 2009, this issue),
while this reasoning also played a role in Australia (e.g. Bulkeley 2001). By contrast, the
APP was seen as a forum to directly cooperate with these countries. For the US, it was a
way to work on a more manageable scale rather than having all countries involved; and to
do so in a voluntary fashion with a more concrete and sectoral approach.8 In a similar vein,
an Australian government official stressed that the primary goal of the APP was to: ‘really
(…) find a way and a place to work constructively with the big economies in our region on
climate change mitigation but from a much broader perspective that is more in tune with
their national interests’.9
An additional explanation for Australia’s special role—as first invited and as initially
most enthusiastic partner—in the APP is related to its political ties with the US. First,
6 Interview, Jan Adams, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 1 December
2006.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview, official, US State Department, 12 March 2008.
9 Interview, Jan Adams, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 1 December
2006.
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Australia had originally been part of the JUSCANZ10 negotiation bloc in the climate
negotiations—and still forms a coalition with the US and other countries through the
‘Umbrella Group’. Second, there were close ideological similarities between the Bush
administration and the Howard government, with both displaying a strong preference for
‘voluntarism’ and a privileged role for the private sector. Domestic strategies to address
climate change in both countries were characterised by a business-friendly voluntary
approach shunning the use of traditional regulation (Lawrence 2009, this issue; Skodvin
and Andresen 2009, this issue; see also McGee and Taplin 2008). Third, the Howard
government was a close ally for the Bush administration in the war in Iraq.11
If international politics and relations were the dominating factor for the US and Aus-
tralia to form the APP, they certainly also played a part in motivating the other countries to
accept the invitation to join. Japan had belonged to the same negotiation coalitions as the
US and Australia in the UN climate negotiations, while general diplomatic relations with
the US also played a role (van Asselt et al. 2009, this issue). Throughout the negotiations,
Japan had acted as an intermediary between the EU and US positions. After the US decided
not to ratify, Japan sought to reengage the Americans in international climate politics—and
the APP was one opportunity to do so. Similar motivations probably also played a role for
South Korea, and perhaps even for India and China. In addition, it may be difficult to say
no when powerful countries invite others to the table (Karlsson 2009). It is a pragmatic
approach to keep good relations with the superpower, the US, and key trading partners in
the region when very little investment is required, even if some of these countries were
strongly critical of the US and Australian rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. All three
countries—China, India and South Korea—also accepted invitations to the G8 Gleneagles
Dialogue in 2006, as well as the Major Economies Meeting initiated by President Bush in
2007.
A second rationale for countries to join the Partnership can be found in the realm of
domestic politics. This forms a complementary explanation for why Japan accepted the
invitation (van Asselt et al. 2009, this issue). Japan’s international position on post-2012
climate policy has been plagued by divergent approaches of its Ministry of Environment
(MOE) and the stronger Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), with the former
displaying a preference for continuing along the lines of Kyoto, and the latter openly
criticising the treaty. A third player in the domestic context is the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), which is primarily interested in keeping good ties with the US, but also
seeks to show leadership on environmental issues. METI was the main supporter of the
APP in Japan, although MOFA made the decision to join. Despite MOE’s focus on the
Kyoto process it did not object to Japan’s participation in the APP. The constellation of
bureaucratic actors in Japan was thus conducive to Japan’s joining of the Partnership.
Another explanation at the domestic level is related to the possibility of rewards in the
form of economic gains from transfers of financial or technological resources through APP
projects. This can be pointed to as one of the main reasons for China’s participation
(Heggelund and Buan 2009, this issue). The National Development and Reform Com-
mission saw the APP as providing a new avenue for technology transfer, in addition to the
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Furthermore, several elements of the
APP were in line with the country’s international climate policy preferences, which
10 JUSCANZ refers to Japan, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
11 However, on several issues, such as the International Criminal Court, the US and Australian positions
diverged, with Australia as a strong supporter of this radical strengthening of international law and the US
strongly opposing it (Lawrence 2009, this issue).
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secured the support of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Notably, the Partnership’s
priority of sustaining economic growth while addressing climate change, and the absence
of any financial or other commitments for APP nations made participation in the Part-
nership a low-cost/low-risk decision. Finally, the objective of addressing energy security
matters was in line with domestic preferences (Heggelund and Buan 2009, this issue). For
other countries, economic benefits may also have played a role. In the Australian case, the
prospect of increased trade in the important export sectors of coal, LNG and aluminium,
and their contribution to mitigation was an important motivation for the industry to engage
with the APP; ‘[p]rospective exports to US and clean technology in China [are] the holy
grail’.12 The Howard government considered the mineral, metal and energy sectors as key
to the country’s economic development and it was on the basis of the perceived negative
impacts on these that they rejected Kyoto (Lawrence 2009, this issue).
A separate question is why some countries have continued to support the APP, even
though it has diminished in importance, especially after the 2007 Bali Action Plan laun-
ched negotiations on a post-2012 agreement under the UNFCCC, including the US. For the
US and Australia, this is all the more interesting given that their governments changed
from Republican to Democrat in the US (January 2009), and from the conservative Liberal-
National Party coalition to Labor in Australia (December 2007) (Lawrence 2009, this
issue; Skodvin and Andresen 2009, this issue). In their election campaigns, Barack Obama
(US) and Kevin Rudd (Australia) took a very different stance towards the UN climate
process compared to their predecessors, and in the Australian case one of the first actions of
the new government was to ratify Kyoto. In a similar vein, President Obama has taken a
more positive stance in the post-2012 discussions (Skodvin and Andresen 2009, this issue;
Korppoo and Luta 2009), although it remains to be seen what the US can commit itself to.
Still, after they got into power neither of them has repudiated the APP—and Rudd
explicitly announced Australia’s continued involvement (Lawrence 2009, this issue).
Although clearly an initiative of the previous administration, President Obama has not
yet made any public statements on the APP–neither in favour nor against it. Still, it is likely
that the new administration will continue with the initiative, although probably more
embedded in the UNFCCC process.13 Furthermore, a noteworthy development has been
that Obama convened the ‘Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’, which shows
similarities with the Major Economies Process initiated by the Bush administration as well
as the APP, in particular its ‘minilateral’ approach involving only a limited number of
countries (Skodvin and Andresen 2009, this issue). There are a number of possible
explanations for the US’ continuation of the APP. First, the two main reasons that pre-
vented ratification of the Kyoto Protocol—protection of the American economy and par-
ticipation by major developing economies—have not yet disappeared. These issues still
play a prominent role in the US Congress discussions, and will likely remain critical in
securing US participation in a future climate agreement (Skodvin and Andresen 2009, this
issue). Second, although the US has taken a more positive stance in the UN negotiations,
the APP and Major Economies Forum are still the only major international climate change
initiatives of the US administration, and they may serve as an informal supplement for
international negotiations and sector-based cooperation (Skodvin and Andresen 2009, this
issue; Vihma 2009, this issue). Third, the fact that the US initiated the APP, even though
under another administration, might make it difficult for the current administration to
12 Interview John Daley, Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, 29 November 2006.
13 Frank Biermann, 15 June 2009, Personal communication.
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withdraw support. A withdrawal may negatively affect their standing and relationship
towards the other APP members.
Australia’s continued participation in the APP can be described as a ‘pragmatic deci-
sion’ (Lawrence 2009, this issue). Prime Minister Rudd explicitly related its involvement
to Australia’s status as the world’s major coal exporter, and China as the main importer.
Furthermore, maintaining good relations with domestic industries involved in the APP
likely played a role. However, the APP is now a much less prominent prong of Australia’s
involvement at the international level. The budget for the APP has been reduced (see
above), and attention has shifted to the UN negotiations.
For Japan, the interesting question about the continuity of the Partnership is not related
to changes in government, but rather how it is possible that it has become one of the most
avid proponents of the APP, given that it had such a strong symbolic link with the Kyoto
Protocol (van Asselt et al. 2009, this issue). Japan’s position can be explained not only by
the inter-ministerial conflicts that have characterised its domestic politics, but also by the
strong private sector support of the APP, which includes industries directly involved in
some of the APP task forces. Furthermore, from a strategic perspective, Japan has heavily
promoted the APP as a prime example of the ‘sectoral approach’, which it has advocated in
the post-2012 negotiations in the UN context (van Asselt et al. 2009, this issue; Vihma
2009, this issue).
5 The nature of the APP: hard or soft, public or private?
The second theme we explore in this Special Issue, concerns the question whether the
APP’s nature reflects any particular shift in national and global environmental governance.
The Partnership seems to pose a definitional challenge to social scientists along two related
dimensions: the hard–soft continuum of legalization, and the public–private continuum of
governance.
First, norms (or institutions, rules and laws as alternative and/or overlapping concepts)
come in very different shapes and forms; they can be formal and informal, legally binding
or voluntary, etc. In an international context where the notion of law is less straightfor-
ward, some scholars have suggested the concept of ‘legalization’ to encompass this
diversity of norms (Abbott et al. 2000; Bru¨tsch and Lehmkuhl 2007). Under the umbrella
of legalization, norms can then be differentiated into how ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ they are: where
hard law is seen to entail a higher degree of legal obligation, precision and delegation,
softer law displays less of these features, and is thus more voluntary and vague (Abbott and
Snidal 2000).
The APP is based on an intergovernmental agreement, but does not fall under the
definition of a treaty, as countries have made it clear that the Partnership should not create
any legal rights and duties (APP Charter 2006). The designation of an international
agreement is not determinative with regard to the classification as a treaty.14 Hence the
usage of the word ‘partnership’ would not prevent it from comprising a treaty under
international law if the substance of the agreement was clearly intended to be legally
binding. While this is not the case, the usage of a ‘Charter’, which is commonly reserved
for constitutive international agreements (e.g. the UN Charter), gives it a more formal,
almost treaty-like basis. Furthermore, the agreement contains several clauses that can
14 Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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usually be found in treaties, related to amendments, commencement (i.e. entry into
‘force’), and termination of the Charter (APP Charter 2006).
It is clear that whereas the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol constitute legally binding
treaties—and can thus be considered ‘hard law’—the APP is intended not to have any legal
effects, and could be considered to fall within the scope of ‘soft law’ (Vihma 2009, this
issue). However, this characterisation of APP as soft law, implying outcomes in the form of
norms, can be questioned. The founders of the APP emphasise that it is not a policy-
making process, but rather a ‘project oriented exercise’,15 only resulting in concrete action.
However, norms cannot be separated from practice, and the APP undoubtedly contributes
to developing norms in various ways. First, the constellation of the Partnership itself—as a
voluntary enterprise focused on economic development and technology cooperation—can
be seen as a ‘counter norm’ to the dominating approach of climate governance rooted in
hard law. McGee and Taplin (2009, this issue) describe how the APP has been used as a
‘discursive contestation’ of the international climate regime, and can be considered a
‘deregulatory’ form of ecological modernisation, ‘favouring non-binding activity to
facilitate trade in cleaner technologies and practices rather than the binding emission
reduction targets and regulatory institutions of the international carbon market’. The dis-
cussion on interplay with the UN climate regime below further highlights the APP’s
possible impact on the future shape of hard law, where one scenario is that it ‘softens’ the
post-2012 climate regime by influencing it to move away from specific country-based
absolute emission reduction commitments and/or include aspirational, sector-based goals
(Vihma 2009, this issue). Second, the type of activities which are foreseen in the task
forces clearly include explicit norm development such as benchmarking, identifying and
promoting best practices and standards and labelling.
Turning to the second continuum along which we can locate the Partnership, gover-
nance comes in all shapes; from being an all-government affair (unicentric or hierarchical
governance) to comprising pure private actor initiatives (multicentric governance). The
governance concept has won fame in recent years because it can encompass all types of
actors. Some scholars further divide the concept of governance into public and private
governance, and then refer to ‘hybrid’ forms of governance as something in between where
both state and none-state actors are involved (Ba¨ckstrand 2008; Andonova et al. 2009;
McGee and Taplin 2009, this issue).
Choosing the designation of the APP on this continuum is far from straightforward. The
founders call it a public–private partnership which would put it in the hybrid governance
category, although McGee and Taplin (2009, this issue) argue that it is an ‘elite form’ of
hybrid governance, given the limited participation of civil society organisations. However,
states are the dominant actors: the APP was initiated by governments alone; the founding
Charter was signed only by governments; and the top layer of the governance structure is
confined to governments. Furthermore, the PIC is comprised of solely government rep-
resentatives (McGee and Taplin 2009, this issue). The private sector representatives are
only active in the task forces but also here the governments act as Chairs and co-Chairs.
Nonetheless, the whole ethos of the APP is to engage the private sector as the main actors
and to ‘elevate the role of non-state actors in the international response to climate change’
(McGee and Taplin 2009, this issue). Government officials in the initiating countries put
this in stark contrast with the UN based climate regime, where business actors have a much
15 Interview, Jan Adams, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 1 December
2006.
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more marginal role.16 In conclusion, the APP has a hybrid character, covering both the
public and private forms on the governance continuum, which makes the analysis of its
legitimacy challenging and multifaceted (see below).
6 Interplay between the APP and the UN climate regime
The third theme of this Special Issue deals with the interplay between non-UN initiatives
like the APP and the UN climate regime. The existence of a multitude of approaches in
global climate governance could exert both a positive and negative influence on the efforts
under the UNFCCC umbrella (Biermann et al. 2009, in press). On the positive side,
overlapping approaches could lead to some form of competition among the initiatives, and
a diffusion of best policy practices. Initiatives with fewer participating nations may also
lead to faster emission reductions, as they do not have to go through lengthy and complex
negotiation processes. Additionally, they may eventually be able to tackle areas and
controversial issues which have remained unaddressed in the multilateral framework, such
as energy policy and specific industry sectors. On the other hand, initiatives involving a
limited number of players could lead to a disproportionate influence of powerful countries.
Furthermore, a plethora of forums addressing climate change gives a confusing signal to
private actors that want to invest in cleaner technologies. Finally, the various non-UN
initiatives often address only a part of the climate change problem, and most of them do not
tackle the issue of climate impacts and adaptation (Biermann et al. 2009, in press). As a
result of the potential interactions, the relevance of non-UN initiatives for future climate
governance, depending on the extent of their success or failure, should not be underesti-
mated. This leads us to the question: how does the APP interact with the UN climate
regime?
McGee and Taplin (2006) addressed this question by examining the interplay between
the APP and the Kyoto Protocol, focusing on the claim that the APP is ‘complementary’ to
the Protocol. Participating countries have been at pains to make it clear that the Partnership
is meant to complement, and not replace, the treaty (e.g. APP Vision Statement 2006; see
Vihma 2009, this issue). However, McGee and Taplin (2006, p. 178) argue that the APP
cannot be considered complementary ‘[i]f one policy obstructs or undermines the effec-
tiveness of another’. They posit that the mere existence of a voluntary, non-binding
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol reduces the incentive to participate in the climate regime
for countries with emission reduction commitments (McGee and Taplin 2006; see also
Christoff and Eckersley 2007). Kellow (2006, p. 300), however, argues that the APP rather
presents a ‘valuable new model for multilateral negotiations’, emphasising the benefits of
approaches with a limited number of players.
In their contribution, McGee and Taplin (2009, this issue) build on their previous claim,
by assessing whether the main features of the APP and other initiatives involving the US,
Australian and Canadian governments—such as the Major Economies Process and the
APEC Sydney Declaration—represent an alternative discourse in global climate gover-
nance. They argue that these non-UN initiatives have been employed by these governments
in order to contest future emission reduction commitments. McGee and Taplin (2009, this
issue) support their claim by pointing to various design features present and absent in these
initiatives as compared to the UN climate treaties. Whereas the Kyoto Protocol is
16 Interview, Jan Adams, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 1 December
2006; Interview, official, US State Department, 12 March 2008.
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characterised by absolute greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for developed coun-
tries, differentiation between developed and developing countries, and the promotion of
market-based flexibility mechanisms, these are all conspicuously absent in the design of
the APP. Instead, the Partnership—as well as the other non-UN initiatives—relies more on
aspirational emissions intensity targets and public–private sector-based cooperation to
promote cleaner technologies and practices. The ‘discursive coalition’ promoting this
alternative vision was led by the US, Australia and Japan, and later received support from
Canada. However, the coalition only received limited support from countries like China
and India. Furthermore, the coalition seems to have weakened following the changes in
government in the US and Australia (see above).
Vihma (2009, this issue) approaches the interplay between the APP and the UN climate
regime from a different angle, by examining the extent to which any influence of non-UN
initiatives like the APP can be witnessed in the UN negotiations. In UN meetings in 2007–
2008, several industrialised countries participating in the APP—Australia, Canada, Japan
and the US—made various references to the Partnership, in particular advocating the
‘sectoral approach’ it takes, as well as its voluntary bottom-up approach. Japan in par-
ticular has been active in promoting the APP as a prime example of its proposed sectoral
approach, even though the sectoral approach it later suggested in the UN negotiations does
not match the model of the APP (van Asselt et al. 2009, this issue). In this example of
‘cognitive interaction’ (Oberthu¨r and Gehring 2006), the APP was thus used as a model of
sectoral cooperation, with a view to influencing the UN negotiations. Vihma (2009, this
issue) argues that although sectoral approaches have indeed found their way into the
negotiations—notably in the Bali Action Plan—other elements of the APP, such as its
voluntary, bottom-up approach, have not been adopted (yet).
The exact influence of the APP and other non-UN initiatives on the development of the
UN climate regime remains difficult to pinpoint. However, the contributions to this issue
show that there are ways in which the Partnership affects the future shape of global climate
governance. In this regard, a more comprehensive analysis of the interplay between the
APP and the climate regime may be worthwhile following the possible conclusion of the
post-2012 UN negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. At this time, the US gov-
ernment position on the future of the APP may also have been clarified, providing some
indication of the viability of the Partnership.
7 Concluding remarks
After the initial reactions of excitement, outrage and indifference in the start-up phase of
the APP, the Partnership has left the radar screen of many observers. The Partnership itself
has mainly focused on the first small steps of implementing projects. The UNFCCC
negotiations launched in Bali reaffirmed to many the central importance of the UN process
in the international efforts to address climate change. This feeling was strengthened by the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the Australian government and the positive engage-
ment that President Obama is making with that process.
Although these signs could be interpreted as unequivocal support for the UN climate
regime, it is unlikely that the APP will cease to exist. However soft the arrangement is,
there is considerable inertia in closing down institutionalised activities. All participating
countries have invested time and resources in the venture and over 100 projects have been
set in motion. Furthermore, it is by no means evident that post-2012 climate governance
will be solely focused on the UN process. A future climate agreement could still be
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accompanied by flanking governance arrangements of countries and private actors that are
not satisfied with the negotiation outcomes, or that seek to fulfil their commitments using
different forums. Moreover, initiatives outside the UNFCCC will remain relevant as they
could influence the shape of UN climate governance at the cognitive level. Already, the
sectoral approach promoted in the APP has reached the UNFCCC negotiation agenda; even
though there is no consensus yet on how such an approach should be part of a future
agreement.
We conclude that the APP is very likely to continue its work and that it has had at least
cognitive impacts on the global climate regime. However, we would also argue that there is
a need to look at the APP in the larger context of the effectiveness and legitimacy of
different forms of global governance. In this regard, the central questions are: what is the
impact of a governance arrangement on the problems it is designed to create; and how
legitimate is its claim to authority?
It is still too early to make judgements on how the APP will affect greenhouse gas
emissions in its member countries, and as with all attempts of measuring regime effec-
tiveness it will be almost impossible to assign emission reductions—or greenhouse gas
intensity improvements, to use the Partnership’s own yardstick—to the APP alone.
However, the meagre public funding injected into the APP, the unclear vision of how
technology development is going to work, as well as the lack of project activities aimed
directly at emission reductions does not lead to high expectations. Still, the sectors
involved have huge potential to reduce emissions by adopting best practices from other
countries, so if there is a significant amount of learning taking place among private actors,
it could potentially have an impact. The low expectations about the effectiveness of the
APP are in line with assumptions made about hard and soft law. It has been noted that soft
law lacks the strong surveillance and enforcement offered by hard law (Kirton and Tre-
bilcock 2004) and may lead to reduced compliance (Shelton 2000).17 On the other hand,
there are claims that soft law is better at dealing with uncertainty and a changing tech-
nology driven environment (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Reinicke and Witte 2000; Shelton
2000); facilitating cooperation and compromise over time (Abbott and Snidal 2000;
Chinkin 2000); and enable learning, norm diffusion and changing interests (Abbott and
Snidal 2000; Trubek et al. 2005). These features all have relevance for the situation in
which the APP was created, as its members had very different positions and interests in
addressing climate change, there was considerable uncertainty on the nature of the post-
2012 regime, and technology and innovation play an important role.
In addition to effectiveness, governance is frequently evaluated against the criterion of
procedural legitimacy. Besides effectiveness, equity is an important part of what some
refer to as ‘output legitimacy’. Equity impacts of the APP are, however, difficult to
evaluate, especially at this early stage. The financial flows for technology transfer to the
developing countries in the APP are still very humble, and it is hard to determine the
relative benefits for the different member countries and/or companies participating. It is
much easier to consider how the APP performs in terms of input or procedural legiti-
macy.18 Possible sources of procedural legitimacy include: a fair degree of participation
both by government and non-governmental actors; a high level of transparency in the
norm development and implementation process; and good accountability mechanisms
17 However, many of the rather sweeping assumptions on the character of hard and soft law which we refer
to here are made without considering the significant diversity within these norm categories, and/or have
weak empirical basis for comparison (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma 2009).
18 See Scharpf (1999) for a discussion of output and input legitimacy.
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(Karlsson-Vinkhyzen and Vihma 2009). The APP has not actively sought to expand its
membership beyond its original six members, and with the exception of Canada, it is thus a
very small and exclusive club in comparison to the UNFCCC. It has also been a closed
club in relation to NGOs and the public in general; these groups have neither been
informed nor consulted before the launch of the Partnership, nor have they been given a
place at the table later. The business community, some researchers and international or-
ganisations have been the main groups invited to participate so far. In terms of transpar-
ency the public has access to the APP websites which include information on the task force
action plans, project implementation and the PIC meetings. Thus, while the participation of
non-state stakeholders in developing soft law can be an important source of their legiti-
macy, the APP has also confirmed the concern raised that soft law can compromise
democratic participation when certain stakeholders are left out (Kirton and Trebilcock
2004), and normal systems of accountability are bypassed.
We hope the contributions to this Special Issue will not only bring out the latest findings
on the APP, but also highlight some issues that merit further scrutiny. The main outstanding
question with respect to the APP’s effectiveness concerns the eventual achievements of its
task forces in reducing barriers to—and facilitating—the development and transfer of cli-
mate friendly technologies and thus contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. A further key issue is the potential interaction between the Partnership and a
post-2012 agreement under the UNFCCC. On legitimacy, there is a need for more sys-
tematic comparison of accountability arrangements around the APP in each of the member
countries as compared to the UN climate regime, including an analysis of parliamentary
oversight and the ability of elected representatives to influence the continuation or termi-
nation of the APP. Finally, it would be valuable to develop our understanding of what
moved Canada, the late but eager member of the APP, and India, one of the countries most
frequently emphasising the importance of the UNFCCC, to join the APP. We expect that the
contributions to this Special Issue have built a solid foundation for such further inquiry.
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